The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-Authoritarian Greece by Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A.
 Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée
orientale et le monde turco-iranien 
20 | 1995
Médias d’Iran et d’Asie Centrale
The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy












Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, « The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-
Authoritarian Greece », Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien [Online],
20 | 1995, Online since 13 May 2006, connection on 19 April 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/cemoti/1674 
This text was automatically generated on 19 April 2019.
Tous droits réservés
The Remains of Authoritarianism:
Bureaucracy and Civil Society in
Post-Authoritarian Greece
Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
1 The dominant view of Greek civil society is that it is weak compared to the civil societies
of other West European countries1. At the same time, the Greek bureaucracy is not as
strong as its West European counterparts in the sense that the Greek bureaucracy, even
after  the  fall  of  the  colonels'  authoritarian  regime,  cannot  resist  the  incursions  of
conservative  or  populist  political  elites,  which,  organized around the parties  of  New
Democracy and PASOK respectively, have alternated in power since 1974.
2    The  topic  of  bureaucracy  and  civil  society  in  contemporary  Greece  presents  a
theoretically interesting paradox: the relations between the central Greek state and civil
society  are  shaped  by  state  corporatism,  which  still  thrives,  although  corporatism's
favorable political  context,  authoritarianism,  has ceased to exist  since the fall  of  the
colonels' regime in 19742.The case of Greece is taken as an example of state-civil society
relations which differ from the West European model. While in the West civil societies
have generally been able to limit state action or grow in concert with it, in Greece both
the bureaucracy and civil society have been permeated by pervasive party factionalism.
3    After the transition to democracy in Greece in 1974, the relations between the state and
civil society were modified, as the power of the central state, which had reached a peak
under the seven-year long military dictatorship,  was balanced by the parties  of  New
Democracy and PASOK,  which alternated in power forming single-party governments
throughout the last twenty years. Yet the authoritarian quality of the relations between
the central government and civil society, which has characterized Greek society since the
end of World War II, was not effaced.
4    Post-war Greek society bore the legacy of the Civil War between the right and the left
(1944-1949),  which,  until  the breakdown of democracy in 1967,  meant that organized
interests were disciplined by the hegemonic coalition of throne, army and conservative
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governments and later by the dictators for a period of thirty years (1944-1974)3. In 1974,
1981 and 1990 the single-party governments of New Democracy and PASOK took turns in
first  capturing  the  bureaucracy  and  then  using  various  institutional  mechanisms  to
monitor civil society and especially so the farmers' movement, the labor unions, and the
associations of public employees4. It will be argued that under a new democratic regime,
such as post-authoritarian Greece, which seems much more open when compared to the
"disciplined"  and  "guided"  democracy  of  the  post-war  years,  a  state  corporatist
arrangement of state-civil society relations has survived5.
5    The  attribution  of  a  state  corporatist  character  to  the  Greek  mode  of  interest
representation, suggested by George Th. Mavrogordatos, is not undisputed in Greek social
research6. Nikos P. Mouzelis argues that the mode of organization of lower-class interests
in Greece is neither state corporatist nor societal corporatist but, as in the rest of the
semi-periphery, is "incorporative," i.e. it is characterized by the de facto control of the
state over associations, which are weak and subjected to state manipulation. For Mouzelis
there are two modes of "incorporation," clientelism and populism, and both of them can
be found in semi-peripheral societies7. A third opinion, which is not very different from
that of Mouzelis, bas been offered by Constantine Tsoucalas8. Tsoucalas suggests that in
contemporary  Greece  there  is  "clientelistic  corporatism,"  which  entails  corporatist
arrangements between the state and preferred social groups. The established corporatist
arrangements promote the interests of the bourgeoisie and fractions of the urban middle
strata  through  selective  distribution  of  state  subsidies  and  public  employment
opportunities to governing party loyalists.
6    The opinion supported in this paper is that, while organized interests in Greece are to a
large  extent  controlled  in  the  fashion  of  state  corporatism,  the  consolidated  Greek
democracy has allowed for the emergence of pluralism in the representation of interests
other than purely economic ones, such as the interests of ecological, feminist, cultural,
consumera'  and  health  and  social  provision  movements.  Among  other  reasons,  the
existence of strong parties in a highly polarized party system, embedded in the tradition
of acute ideological divisions between Venizelists and Anti-venizelists in the first half of
this century and between the Right and the Left in the postwar era, bas been reflected at
the  level  of  interest  representation.  However,  political  party  struggles  are  not  as
intensely reflected at the level of representation of non-material interests, which is still
inchoate. Multiple single-issue social movements have flourished after the transition to
democracy. These movements are still tiny, fragmented and weak, but as long as political
parties do not acquire an interest in them, they are allowed to develop and at the local
level even become legitimate interlocutors in negotiations with state authorities.
7    The coexistence of two systems of interest representation under a democratic regime,
i.e.  of  state  corporatism  with  regard  to  the  relations  between  the  bureaucracy  and
organized  interests,  and  of  pluralism  with  regard  to  the  bureaucracy  and  social
movements can be better understood, if the concepts of bureaucracy and civil society are
decomposed in this analysis. Indeed, the empirical investigation of the relations between
bureaucracy and civil  society entails the decomposition of both concepts,  if  one is to
compare the two in terms of their relative strengths and weaknesses.
8    There are several approaches to the study of the relations between bureaucracy and
civil  society.  One  is  to  concentrate  on  particular  public  policies  and  examine  how
bureaucratic initiatives and responses interact with societal interests and affect policy
outcomes.  Another way is  to study the types of  contacts  between the administrative
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personnel of the state and individual citizens turning to the state as a service agency to
enjoy offered goods and services. A third way is to look into the interactions between
bureaucracy  and  organized  interests,  focusing  on  the  overt  and  covert pressures
exercised by various pressure groups on political and bureaucratic elites. A fourth way,
which will be pursued in this paper, is to map the civil society and try to evaluate how
strong  or  weak  various  segments  of  civil  society  are  when  compared  to  the  state
apparatus.
9    The pivotal concepts of the fourth way are 'strength' or 'weakness' of any given state
and  civil  society  and  will  be  defined  later  in  the  paper,  after  a  short  excursus  on
'bureaucracy' and 'civil society'. In the meantime, it must be said that the advantage of
the last approach over the previous three ones is that it allows for a bird's eye view of
state-society relations, without narrowing the scope of analysis to a single policy, and
that it may provide the background for future comparisons between the Greek case and
the cases of other semi-peripheral societies, such as those of Southern Europe and the
Southern Cone of Latin America.
10    Bureaucracy is one of the state structures and is composed of ministries and public
enterprises  which  have  a  coercive  and  a  service  function.  Both  functions  are  to  be
fulfilled under certain legal and constitutional constraints, which vary by time and place9.
Bureaucracy is usually the largest state institution in terms of personnel and the most
differentiated  institution  in  terms  of  organizational  structure.  In  contemporary
democracy,  while  bureaucracy  serves  the  autonomous  interests  of  political  and
administrative elites, it may also cater to some powerful private interests, depending on
the configuration of state-society relations in a certain space and time. In the process of
serving its own and some private interests bureaucracy fulfils the coercive function of the
state as a despot through various mechanisms such as bureaucratic aggrandizement and
periodic oppression of selected social groups. Bureaucracy also fulfils the second function
of the state, which is the provision of services, including infra-structural support to the
workings of the capitalist market and welfare safety-nets to those segments of society
which are at risk, i.e. particular segments of the labor force permanently or temporarily
cast out of the market. In Greece as in other democratic regimes of the late twentieth
century bureaucracies are entrusted with the coercive and the social welfare functions of
contemporary states, which they fulfil with varying degrees of success depending on the
financial robustness of each state, the politics of the governing political party or coalition
of parties, and the material interests and ideological orientations of state managers. Of
course, the fulfillment of both fonctions is also constrained by constitutional and legal
arrangements, the specific set-up of which depends on the balance of social and political
actors at a certain time and space and the traditions and dominant interpretations that
guide their actions.
11    Having sketched how bureaucracy may be decomposed in its functions, it is instructive
to do the same with civil society. Civil society comprises those areas of social life and
communication that  remain outside  the  immediate  control  of  the  state  mechanisms,
although they may be to an extent regulated by state legislation (e.g. labor law). Civil
society covers the space between household and state, which includes not only the sphere
of production and the market, as dogmatic Marxists would argue, but also other spheres,
such  as  non-economic  social  spheres  or  arenas  inhabited  by  interest  groups,  social
movements, voluntary associations, cultural and religious organizations, and the public
sphere, where the above collective actors interact amongst themselves and the state in
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the context of matters of public interest10. There are instances of civil society which do
not assume an organizational form, such as the self-awareness of interest groups of their
own needs and rights and the strength of  commitment of  social  movements to their
ideology. However, in this paper only organized forms of civil society will be studied, as it
is difficult to assess the strength or weakness of non-organized collective action.
12    The  above  conception  of  bureaucracy  and  civil  society  is  complemented  by  the
distinction between civil  society and "political  society," as understood by Tocqueville
(and, to a certain extent, Gramsci). Political society is distinguished from civil society, as
it is made of purely political associations, mainly political parties, the local government
authorities, juries and public opinion11. While interest groups and voluntary associations
may also be understood as performing political functions (in a wide sense of the term
"political"), it is clear that they participate in politics to influence authority, not to rise to
positions  of  authority  as  political  parties  do.  In  studying  contemporary,  multi-party
democracies it is analytically helpful to distinguish the central state institutions, such as
the  bureaucracy,  the  army,  the  police  and the  judicial  system,  from the  rest  of  the
political  Society,  i.e.  chiefly  from  political  parties.  In  the  following  analysis  of
contemporary Greece, civil society, political society and the central state bureaucracy are
understood as three distinct yet integrating collective entities.
13    Typically in contemporary democracies, political parties function as aggregating and
integrative mechanisms of collective claims towards the bureaucracy. The constituents of
civil society, on the other hand, namely interest groups, social movements and voluntary
organizations,  aggregate interests without integrating them in a political  platform of
priorities as parties are supposed to do. Obviously, the process of interest aggregation by
political parties differs from one society to another, depending on, among other things,
the  socioeconomic  route  to  development  taken  by  a  certain  society  over  time.  For
instance, semi-peripheral societies tend to privilege clientelistic arrangements of interest
representation,  where  individuals,  instead  of  forging  horizontal  ties  with  other
individuals  of  comparable  social  class  or  status,  seek  personal  patrons  (and  patrons
recruit clients) in most aspects of social and political life.
14    However,  while  political  parties  may  function  as  vehicles  of  interest  aggregation,
drawing on claims voiced by various segments of civil society or, in the case of semi-
peripheral societies, also acting as collective patrons, the bureaucracy also forms its own
relations  with  civil  society,  often  bypassing  the  parties.  From  the  standpoint  of
bureaucracy, the relations between state and civil society may take different forms such
as  state  intervention  to  plan  and  steer  economic  development,  provision  of  welfare
services to social strata hard-hit by poverty or unemployment, or coercion of particular
social groups which appear to be un-loyal or (semi-loyal) to the dominant socio-economic
system.  From the standpoint  of  civil  society,  the interventions  and initiatives  of  the
bureaucracy may be invited or resisted, depending on the relative strength of the central
state institutions and the corresponding weakness of  the civil  society in a particular
country over a certain period of time. It can be hypothesized that when the central state
mechanisms  become  stronger,  civil  society  may  become  weaker,  but  this  is  not  a
necessary outcome of state growth. One may posit that over time both state and civil
society  may  become  stronger  or  both  may  become  weaker  than  before.  Empirical
evidence for the applicability of one of the above patterns in the semi-peripheral society
of  contemporary  Greece  will  be  provided  in  the  rest  of  the  paper.  Similar
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conceptualizations of state-society relations in terms of degrees of strength and weakness
have recently appeared in the comparative political literature on modern state12.
15    As Alfred Stepan has noted in his analysis of state-civil society relations in the Southern
Cone of Latin America, there are four possible modes of "the reciprocal relations between
the power of the state and the power of civil society"13. In the first mode, as state power
grows, civil society weakens in a zero-sum fashion. In the second mode, both the power of
the state and the power of the civil society grow. In the third mode, the strength of the
state becomes weaker as does the power of civil society. In the last, fourth mode, the
power of civil society increases as that of the state decreases in a zero-sum way.
16    The preceding four-fold schema begs the question of the definition and measurement of
relative strength and weakness of the central state institutions, particularly bureaucracy
itself, and civil society. There are several indicators used to measure the strength of the
central  state,  such  as  the  state's  tax-raising  capacity,  the  public  sector's  share  of
economic activity and the percentage of the labor force employed in the public sector. All
the  above  indicators  do  not  measure  the  repressive  capacity  of  the  state  nor  the
qualitative aspects of its strength, but only the state's capacity for intervention in the
economy.
17    The qualitative aspects of the central state's strength may be indicated by the existence
of legal and financial mechanisms at the disposal of the central state, with which the
central  government  may  attempt  to  control  the  mobilization  of  civil  society.  Other
relevant indicators are the legal framework for the supervision of the activity of trade
unions and social movements, the cohesion of the civil service as expressed in its internal
organization, the common social background and professional training of civil servants.
Of course, the legitimacy of the state is also a qualitative indicator, which is very difficult
to assess on the basis of existing opinion data, since those usually refer not to the state
per se but to the regime (democracy) or the government (the party or coalition of parties
in power).
18    The highest  the values obtained in the aforementioned quantitative and qualitative
indicators,  the stronger is  the central  state and the weaker the civil  society,  if  their
relation is a zero-sum relation. If, however, the mode of their relations is not zero-sum,
then no conclusion can be drawn about the performance of civil society as long as only
indicators of state strength have been used. As already noted, it may be that the strength
of the state increases in parallel with the strength of civil society (positive-sum relation)
or that the state becomes weaker and civil society weakens too. In both those cases of
prallel  rise  or  decline of  the central  state  and the civil  society,  other  indicators  are
required to measure the strength of civil society and in particular to evaluate the size,
mobilization capacity,  autonomy of  collective action and organizational  coherence of
interest groups, social movements and voluntary associations. Such indicators referring
to the strength or weakness of civil society are the size of the industrial working class, the
organizational density of the workers and the employees' associations, the frequency and
extent of strike activity, and the number and mobilization capacity of social movements
and voluntary associations.
19    Data for the estimation of the quantitative and qualitative indicators of the rise or
decline of power of bureaucracy and civil society are not always available. Particularly
difficult is to assess the development of civil society over time in countries like modern
Greece, where adequate time series data on social and political development are missing
and native  historical  research leaves  much to  be  desired (with the  exception of  the
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economic  history  and intellectual  history  of  modern Greece).  A  cursory view  of  the
present  condition  of  the  Greek  bureaucracy  and  of  the  development  of  trade  union
movements of workers,  farmers and public employees in Greece cannot miss striking
continuities  in  the  internal  organization  and  control  of  the  bureaucracy  and  the
movements from "above," i.e. from the party-dominated political authority.
20    The Greek bureaucracy is relatively large in size but remains largely inefficient and
weak compared to political parties which have alternated in power since the fall of the
colonels'  regime.  The  inflated  nature  of  the  Greek  bureaucracy  and  of  the  central
government is indicated by a few statistical figures. The size of the Greek cabinet rose
from  32  ministers  in  1973  to  57  in  198814.  According  to  OECD  data,  government
expenditure as percentage of the GDP rose spectacularly from 21 percent in 1976 to 51
percent  in  1988  and  public  sector  employment  as  percentage  of  total  employment
increased from 8.5 percent to 10.1 percent in the same period15. However, according to
another  estimate  by  Tsoucalas, which applies  to  the  period of  PASOK in  power,  the
number of civil servants increased by 21 percent between 1981 and 198916. The fact is that
the size of state personnel had already started growing when Nea Democratia was in
power; as OECD data show, in 1970-1975 the average annual growth rate of employment
in general government was higher than the equivalent average in 1975-1982 in all OECD
countries (including Italy and Spain) except for Greece, where government employment
grew faster in 1975-1982 than in 1970-19751717. From the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s
public  enterprises proliferated as the New Democracy party nationalized a few debt-
ridden private enterprises after the transition to democracy and PASOK created new
state-owned companies to intervene in the private sector of the economy. As a result,
according to an OECD report, "total employment in the wider public sector (including
utitlities, firms and banks under state control) accounted for almost 30 percent of total
dependent employment in 1990"18.
21    The increases in all statistical figures cited above belie the reality of weakness of the
Greek state. The Greek bureaucracy is rather large for a country which still is at a middle
level of economic development and does not yet have a comprehensive welfare system.
Yet  the  same  bureaucracy  is  not  strong  enough  either  to  make  its  presence  in  the
economy decisively felt in the sense of a competent state machine which steers economic
development) or resist the periodic incursions of alternating political elites and party
personnel in its interior.
22    In fiscal terms the Greek bureaucracy is practically unable to impose direct taxes on the
population. In 1991 in Greece taxes on personal income amounted to 4.8 percent of the
GDP, while the European Union average was 10.9 percent. Taxes on corporate income
amounted to 1.7 percent of the GDP of Greece, while the European Union average was 3.0
percent. On both accounts the performance of the Greek state is very low when compared
to other member-states of the European Union, including Southern European countries
with similar labor force profiles (i.e. with relatively large employment in the sectors of
agriculture and petty commodity production). The tax raising capacity of the Greek state
has remained almost stagnant between 1980 and 1991 as tax revenues from personal
income as  percentage of  the GDP rose only by 0.5  percent,  while  tax revenues from
corporate  income  rose  only  by  0.6  percent  between  the  same  years19.  The  chronic
inabilities  of  the  Greek  bureaucracy  are  also  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  1975  funds
collected from direct taxes constituted only 21 percent of total state budget revenues and
in 1988 the same kind of funds increased only to 27 percent of the total20.
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23    In terms of management and re-organization the Greek bureaucracy depends on the
whims of the leadership of the two major political parties which have succeeded each
other in power,  forming single-party governments,  for a total  of  nineteen out of the
twenty-one years that have passed since the 1974 transition to democracy. Both parties,
New Democracy and PASOK, have inflated the political  component of bureaucracy by
creating inter-ministerial committees of political appointees and councils of advisers to
ministers as well as whole new ministries out of former public agencies or secretariats21.
Between 1981 and 1989, while PASOK was in power, a total of twelve laws reorganizing
the central  government and the public administration were passed and in 1990-1993,
while the New Democracy party was in power, another five such administrative reform
laws were voted by the parliament.
24    In  contemporary  democracies  central  bureaucracies  are  often  controlled  by  the
governing parties or coalitions of parties in varying degrees. In Greece democracy has
been associated with a clientelistic domination of the bureaucracy. Government changes
are  directly  linked to  ensuing administrative  changes.  An extensive  ebb and flow of
administrative  personnel  and  structures  accompanies  each  succession  of  parties  in
power, making the Greek bureaucracy a prime example of a modern party politicized
state institution. Although successive majoritarian party governments are not always able
to implement fully their policies due to some bureaucratic obstruction, whenever there is
a determined minister,  supported by competent advisors,  there is very little that the
Greek bureaucracy can do to counter government plans.
25    Greek  bureaucrate  are  usually  trained  in  law  or  political  science,  but  rarely  have
additional pre-service or in-service training. They lack expertise in modern methods of
management,  do  not  keep  up  with  developments  in  new   technologies  and  do  not
constitute an independent cohesive group. Even the higher administrative personnel is
fragmented into many "corps," none among which shares an "esprit de corps" or at least
a  common  social  background.  Change  of  "corps"  is  impossible  and  inter-ministerial
mobility of civil servants is very rare.
26    The organizational fragmentation of the civil service is complemented by its political
factionalism along party affiliations. The parties of New Democracy, PASOK and KKE (the
communist party) have put forward their respective labor organizations of civil servants,
which struggle for power in ADEDY, the nationwide general confederation of unions of
civil servants, and in each ministry or public enterprise22. If at the collective level interest
representation is attained through party-led unions sharing power at the national-level
confederation,  at  the  individual  level  career  advancement  is  achieved  through  the
mechanisms of bureaucratic clientelism23. Essentially, bureaucratic clientelism, a recent
phenomenon  in  Greece,  differs  from  older  forms  of  clientelism  in  that  a  party
bureaucracy, not a single patron, acts in an organized, bureaucratic fashion to infiltrate
the state machine with party devotees and distribute favors to party clients such as initial
hiring, quick promotion or favorable transfers to better posts in the civil service.
27    The distinction Between bureaucracy and governing parties, employed in this paper
despite  the  close  association  of  the  central  bureaucracy  with  political  power  in
contemporary Greece, is useful in order to qualify the image of the overpowering Greek
bureaucracy. Our main point has been that political parties rule unchallenged over the
central  bureaucracy,  which,  because  of  a  long  tradition  of  interest  intermediation
through patronage mechanisms, has never acquired an independent status in the political
system of  modern Greece.  A political  culture evolving around the logic  of  individual
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intermediation with the power-holders, a pluralist but polarized party system, and the
vagaries  of  acutely  divisive  political  conflict  throughout  the  twentieth  century  have
contributed, among other factors, to the subjection of the administrative system to the
fluctuations of the political system, making the former wholly dependent on the latter24.
If  the contemporary Greek bureaucracy seems overgrown, due to the proliferation of
administrative  structures  and  the  recruitment  of  new  employees,  fuelled  by  party
patronage, its inflated size does not correspond to a build-up of bureaucratie strength. If
anything, the Greek bureaucracy today resembles a colossus with feet of clay25.
28    Continuities with the past can also be discerned in the structure and functions of ail the
trade union movements in Greece, in the periodic intervention of the central government
in  the  selection  of  their  leadership  and  in  the  fnancial  dependency  of  the  peak
associations of workers and employees on state funds. Three distinctive characteristics of
the trade union movements in Greece are : the coexistence of official and unofficial labor
organizations,  the institutional  and financial  dependency of  peak associations on the
state, the extensive internal fragmentation of the trade union movements at all levels of
organization.
29    The  workers'  movement  took its  present  official  form of  a  single  confederation of
workers' organizations, the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE), in the
wake of World War I and was subjected to state control already in the inter-war period.
The same can be said for the farmers' confederation (PASEGES), which was founded in the
1930s. The trade union movement of civil servants was also organized as a nationwide
single confederation (ADEDY) immediately after the World War II. The formal confederate
organization of the movements of workers, farmers and public employees movement has
remained more or less the same since their inception. It is revealing of the "statizing"
nature of  Greek corporatism that all  three labor confederations were founded before
independent local  labor organizations had matured and that the confederations were
either created "from above," by the state (e.g. ADEDY in 1945), or were quickly subsumed
under state control (e.g. GSEE in the inter-war period). As Adamantia Pollis has shown,
not only the Greek state, but also foreign powers, such as the U.S.A. at the end of WW II,
have  intervened  to  make  sure  that  the  Greek  labor  movement  does  not  enjoy  an
independent existence26.
30    However, since the 1960s the informal development of other labor movements, outside
the formal structure of the labor organizations of workers, farmers and public employees,
has periodically expanded and abated,  creating a double structure,  an official  and an
unofficial one, in the Greek trade union movement. The official trade union movement
(the GSEE confederation for  workers  and other wage-earners)  has  been the arena of
factional contests exactly mirroring the political contests of the corresponding political
parties. The unofficial trade union movement, working inside and outside the frame of
GSEE,  has  also  depended  on  the  strategies  of  the  main  parties27.  Labor  movements
unsolicited by any political  party have also appeared at  the plant  or  company level,
without being able te, survive for more than a few years at a time. The double structure of
the trade union movement in Greece is its first distinctive feature.
31    Its  second  feature  is  the  authoritarian,  licensed  corporatism,  a  variety  of  state
corporatism, present in times of dictatorship and democracy alike28.  During the short
periods  of  authoritarian  rule  (1925-1926,  1936-1940  and  1967-1974)  and  during  the
monitored democratic regime of the immediate post-civil war era the grip of the state on
the working class was much tighter than in the periods of relatively stable democratic
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rule  (1928-1932,  most  of  the  1960s  and  from  1974  to  the  present).  Still,  the  Greek
bureaucracy,  dominated  by  alternating  political  parties  and  intermittent  dictatorial
regimes throughout the twentieth century, has closely controlled the evolution of the
trade union movement through a number of invariable mechanisms. Included in those
monitoring mechanisms are the appointment of temporary administrations of the major
confederations  through  court  decisions  favorable  to  the  governing  party's  will,  the
perpetuation of  economic  dependency  of  the  labor  unions  on the  state  through the
compulsory collection of workers'  contributions by designated state agencies and the
distribution of state funds to selected, favored unions at the discretion of the Minister of
Labor, the exclusion of disfavored, oppositional first-level unions from the congresses of
the confederations of workers, farmers and public employees; the imposition by the state
of  compulsory  arbitration  in  the  event  of  unsuccessful  negotiations  between  the
associations of employers and employees29.
32    A third feature of the Greek trade union movement is its extensive fragmentation not
only in party-led factions but also in first  -and second-level  organizations.  The labor
movement is organized in three tiers. The first tier consists of first-level unions, such as
local sections of federations of workers exercising the same trade and plant-level unions.
The second tier consists of federations of workers from the same trade and of local labor
centers which encompass all first-level organizations over a certain geographical region30
. The third tier consists of confederations of second-level unions and labor centers, such
as the aforementioned General  Confederation of  Workers  of  Greece (GSEE),  the civil-
service confederation (ADEDY) and the confederation of farmers (PASEGES).
33    Although the multiplication and fragmentation of first-level labor organizations is not
unknown in other European countries,  in contemporary Greece the phenomenon han
reached extreme proportions. According to one estimation31, in 1981 there were over four
thousand two hundred first-level organizations of workers in a society in which wage-
and salary earners are comparatively few (they constituted only 51 percent of the active
labor  force  in  1981)32.  Fragmentation is  also  evident  in  the  other  two tiers  of  labor
organization.  At  the second tiers  of  the workers'  movement  in 1986 there were one
hundred sixty four second-level  autonomous organizations of  workers belonging to a
single third-level confederation, the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE)33
33. There is fragmentation even at the third tier, as GSEE is the third-level organization of
workers  and  employees  employed  at  the  private  sector  (including  some  public
enterprises),  while  there  is  another  third-level  organization,  ADEDY,  only  for  civil
servants working for the central government. Fragmentation may spell pluralism and
thus be a sign of strength of the labor movement, but in the case of Greece of the 1970s
and the early  1980s we encounter  party-led fragmentation which stifles  civil  society
initiatives not sanctioned by the main political parties.
34    The organizational  (or  trade union)  density  of  the Greek trade union movement is
slightly  power  than  the  European  Community  (EC)  average  and  differs  by  sector.
Generally, it has been estimated that in the late 1970 the overall trade union density was
between 27 and 32 percent, while the EC average was 42 percent. Today it is estimated
that the density is approximately 25 percent, while the European Union average is 37.6
percent34.  The trade union density of  the Greek civil  servants confederation is  much
higher,  reaching  90  percent,  as  is  the  trade  union  density  of  particular  labor
organizations of the wider public sector35. For instance, the employees working in the
state-controlled  banking  sector  (organized  in  the  OTOE union),  in  the  Civil  Aviation
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Authority (organized in the OSPA union) and in the electrical power company (organized
in the GENOP-DEH union) have put together particularly strong labor federations36. As a
Eurostat report shows, in Greece between 1982 and 1991 the number of working days lost
through stoppages increased by 21 percent in the industrial sector and by 116 percent in
the services sector. Thus the incidence rate in the services sector more than doubled in
the span of nine years, mainly due to industrial disputes in the water, gas and electricity
sector  and in  the  banking sector.  In  the  same period (1982-1991)  in  the  rest  of  the
European Community there was a downward trend in the industrial sector and only a
moderate increase in the service sector in terms of incidence rate of industrial disputes37.
35    The  representation  of  interests  in  contemporary  Greece  is  also  class-biased
("segmentary" in Guillermo O'Donnel's terminology), in the sense that, as it happens in
state corporatist arrangements under authoritarian rule, the associations of employers
are not as closely controlled. In a country where self-employment is disproportionately
large compared to the size of the salaried strata and small employers constitute the bulk
of the proprietary strata, the image of state-society relations conveyed by the model of
state  or  statizing corporatism is  not  complete,  if  only  the  plight  of  the  trade union
movements of workers and employees is taken into account.  For one thing, the peak
associations of industrialists and shipowners (SEV and EEE respectively) have never been
controlled  by  the  state  in  the  fashion  of  control  imposed  on  the  associations  of
employees; and the peak association of small businessmen (GSEVE) fell in the mid-1980s
in the hands of the Community Party, the left opposition to PASOK government38.
36    Since at least the early 1980s, the Greek salaried strata have born the double burden of
fluctuating inflation and rising unemployment. The inflation rate hovered around the 25
percent mark in 1980 and again in 1985, dropped below 20 percent in 1991 and below 15
percent in 1993, but still remains the highest among the European Union member states39.
Between 1985 and 1991 real hour earnings of industrial workers (deflated by consumer
price indices) increased in every EC country except for Greece, where earnings decreased
on  average  by  1.6  percent  per  year  during  the  above  period.  The  official  rate  of
unemployment in Greece went up from 4.1 of the labor force in 1981 to 7.0 percent in
1991, but, according to newspaper sources, in 1992 and 1993 this rate was shortly a little
below 10 percent40. Although part of the workers registered as unemployed have jobs in
the informal economy, there is little doubt that the lower wage-dependent strata suffered
a compression of their employment opportunities and their real incomes in the second
half of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. The response of the Greek working
class  to  the  worsening  of  labor  market  and  economic  conditions  was  evident  in  its
increasing striking activity.  According to the International  Labor Office,  over 200,000
workers and employees were involved in strikes in 1983, over 1,200,000 workers in 1987,
and over 1,300,000 workers in 199041.  Newspapers report that the number of striking
workers and employees declined below 1,000,000 in 1992 and below 700,000 in 199342. The
relative decline of strike activity may be accounted for by the privatisation process in the
public  sector  and  the  concomitant  prospect  of  lay-offs,  which  might  have  rendered
workers more acquiescent.  Of  course,  the fact  that workers resorted to strikes to an
increasing degree in the late 1980s is another indication that other means of pressure, e.g.
the formation of neo-corporatist structures of collective bargaining were not available to
the working class.
37    To recap, the general picture of the relations between bureaucracy and labor interests
in Greece is close to the type of state corporatism, explored by Philippe C. Schmitter, and
The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-Author...
Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, 20 | 2004
10
to  statizing  corporatism,  suggested  by  Guillermo  O'Donne143.  In  1990  negotiations
between the employers' and the employees' associations that took place without close
monitoring by the state led to signing a two-year long collective bargaining agreement.
Ibis agreement and the negotiations between GSEE and SEV in 1993 are too recent and
inchoate phenomena, but may indicate a more permanent transformation of industrial
relations in Greece for the future. The fact is that since the inception of GSEE in the late
1910s organized labor in Greece has long been under control by the state. This does not
mean to say that Greek civil society as a whole has been invariably weak compared to the
state. Greek civil society has repeatedly felt constrained in its autonomy due to incursions
of political and bureaucratic elites into trade unions; yet not all parts of civil society have
been  tightly  strapped  to  their  chairs  around  the  negotiating  table  with  the  state.
Instances of local or extended family resistance to the state may have existed, but are
difficult  to  assess  as  they  did  not  assume  a  more  permanent  organised  form.  The
associations of employers and small businesses have kept central government at bay. A
few independent  plant-level  organizations  have  survived without  the  support  or  the
control of a particular political party for almost twenty years, since their appearance in
the  wake  of  the  1974  transition  to  democracy.  (e.g.  the  plant-level  unions  of  the
petroleum company ESSO-PAPAS in Attika and of EVIOP-TEMPO in the city of Chalkis44).
Recently,  social  movements  in  the  domains  of  culture,  environmental  protection,
women's issues, consumers' rights, and health and social provision have flourished in
major  Greek  cities  and  are  leading  a  life  independent  of  state  interventionism  and
political party factionalism. Without neglecting the continuing and overbearing presence
of the central government and political parties over civil society, it is worth registering
the  recent  awakening  of  civil  associations  in  Greece,  in  so  far  as  it  represents  a
discontinuity with the recent past.
45
38    After the 1974 transition to democracy the activity of some new social movements, such
as the peace movement or the feminist movement, was fuelled by the three main political
parties of the centre and the left (PASOK, KKE, KKE Interior), creating one peace and one
feminist front organization each and thus splitting these social movements into three
factions from the very beginning of their post-authoritarian existence.
39    Independent  feminist  groups  did  also  exist  in  the  1970s  but  their  appeal  was
concentrated  only  in  a  few intellectual  circles  and student  unions.  Associations  and
organizations which did not enjoy continuous party support either because they were not
originally founded by a certain political party or because they were not later subjected to
party control did not survive (e.g. the voluntary association "Polites Kata tou Nefous,"
which was a citizens' movement against the air pollution in Athens, the feminist group
around the journal  "Skoupa"-  meaning "Broom").  In the 1980s  the activity  of  party-
dominated feminist and peace organizations gradually faded, while new, small voluntary
associations  and  non-governmental  organizations  appeared.  Older  civil  associations,
which had been active in the post-war pre-authoritarian period,  became active again
without the initiative of any particular political party. New social movements made their
appearance  in  the  areas  of  environmental  protection,  feminism,  consumers'  rights,
culture,  public health and social  provision.  The emergence of new social  movements,
albeit nascent in form and small in size, may be attributed to the gradual delegitimation
of the major political parties as exclusive vehicles of political participation and by the
emergence of new problems or the worsening of old ones, such as the deterioration of
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environmental conditions in Greek cities and coasts or the spread of drug use among the
younger generations. The environmentalist, the feminist, and other social movements,
which  will  be  briefly  discussed  below,  have  variant  social  bases  and  mobilisation
capacities. The current state of rulement research in Greece does not allow us to move
beyond the point of a simple description of social movement organizations.
40    The environmentalist movement in contemporary Greece is composed of small local
groups  and  voluntary  associations  and  Greek  sections  of  international  voluntary
organizations. In the past there have been few ecological associations. For example, in the
early 1970s, during the seven-year dictatorship, local movements in the towns of Megara
and Methana resisted the establishment of new industrial plants in their vicinity. In the
same era a scientifc ecological association (ERYEA) was created with the support of the
Greek Chamber of Engineers (TEE) and some industrialists46. Today, local groups engage
in concentrated activity which sporadically  wins the attention of  nation-wide media.
Local initiatives include efforts to save threatened species (e.g. the sea turtle in the Ionian
sea) and to combat government decisions regarding the location of new industrial plants.
(e.g. the plan to establish a geothermal energy unit on the Cycladic island of Milos, the
plan to set up a petrochemical factory on another coast). Every summer volunteer groups
help  to  patrol  the  few  remaining  forests  of  the  Athens  area.  Greek  sections  of
international  voluntary  associations,  such  as  the  World  Wildlife  Fund,  seem  more
persistent and organized in their projects, while Green Peace employs dramatic forms of
protest against environmental pollution47.
41    On the whole, the environmentalist movement is very fragmented and sparsely staffed,
but  has  escaped  infiltration  by  the  major  political  parties.  Currently  there  are
approximately eighty environmentalist  organizations,  claiming a total  membership of
15,00048. The political offshoot of the movement bas been a small Green party (in Greek
Oekologoi-Enallaktikoi) which gained less than one percent of the vote in two general
elections  in  the  end of  the  1980s  (in  November  1989  and in  April  1990)  and won a
parliamentary seat. The party lost its single seat in the recent elections of October 1993
after  it  had  split  into  conflicting  factions.  Still,  the  appeal  of  the  environmentalist
movement is wider than its electoral performance indicates, as environmental concerns
are  now  echoed  in  the  pre-electoral  discourses  of  the  main  political  parties.  The
environmentalist movement in Greece cannot claim that it bas achieved cohesion or that
it has had a significant influence on policy-making. Yet the continuing degradation of
environmental conditions in major Greek cities, in conjunction with the multiplication of
environmentalist organizations and the decay of the old political class, may favor a shift
of  allegiance  of  the  urban  strata  from  the  major  political  parties  to  single-issue
organizations concerned with the environment.
42    The women's movement is also relatively new in Greece, but its origins date back to the
nineteenth century. Its main difference from the environmentalist movement is that it is
partly politicized, owing to the permeation of party factionalism, and partly autonomous
of political parties. Associations of women existed already in the nineteenth century and
some liberal women's organizations fought to grant women the right to vote after the end
of World War II.
43    After the 1974 transition to democracy the three parties of  the center and the left
(PASOK, KKE, KKE Interior) each created their front women's organizations (EGE, OGE,
KDG respectively) subsuming women's issues under the wider struggle to bring about
political  transformation  through  accessing  central  political  power.  An  independent
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feminist organization (KAG) was created in 1975 and later several small women's groups,
adopting socialist and radical feminist viewpoints, emerged in university departments
and  city  neighborhoods  of  Athens  and  Thessaloniki49.  In  parallel,  older  women's
associations, with a liberal feminist profile, continued functioning and mostly remained
outside the control of the noted political parties. A well known feminist organization was
a coordinating committee of representatives of women's organizations (SEGES), which in
the late 1970s unsuccessfully pressed the conservative government of the New Democracy
party for reforms in family law. This committee had twelve women's organizations under
its umbrella. Law reforms were finally effected in the early 1980s while the PASOK party
was  in  power.  Around  the  same  time  the  feminist  press  flourished  -  in  terms  of
periodicals  published  –  and  PASOK's  own  women's  organization  (EGE)  claimed  a
membership of 15,00050.
44    Some progress in promoting the feminist cause was made in the 1980s, mainly due to
pressures exercised on PASOK by intellectuals, by independent women's organizations
and  certainly  by  PASOK's  own  women's  organization  which  was  led  by  the  prime
minister's wife. After the implementation of laws improving the position of women in
marriage and family relations, the women's movement has abated. Since the late 1980s
the  mobilization  of  party-led  women's  organizations  has  slowed  down,  while  some
feminist  periodicals  have  closed.  However,  women's  issues  seem to  concern  a  wider
audience  than  the  organizational  strength  of  women's  organizations  indicates,  as
feminist demands have been filtered in political party programs. In the early 1990s in
Athens there were at least ten active independent women's organizations, which were
not directly tied to any political party. Today these organizations face the challenge of
associating themselves with the major political parties, in order to access the centers of
decision-making, without, however, becoming in the process mere party appendages.
45    The existence of many voluntary associations of variant nature is not something totally
new for Greek society. In the end of the nineteenth century many associations sprang to
promote the development of city neighborhoods and local communities all over Greece
and to promote multiple material and ideal interests, including the irredentist projects of
the political and intellectual elites of the time. Since 1974 new social movements have
sprung in the areas of consumers' rights, culture, public health and social provision, but
most  of  them  remain  embryonic.  Many  among  them  have  taken  the  form  of  non-
governmental organizations and volunteer groupe. For example, in Athens there are two
non-governmental  organizations  (IN.KA  and  Enosi  Katanaloton),  which  receive  the
complaints of consumers and supply them with information on their rights51. In the area
of social provision there is a long tradition of charitable institutions, dating back to the
nineteenth century and usually linked to the Christian Orthodox Church. At the turn of
the century many voluntary associations were created to take rare of the conditions of
hygiene in the large cities and to provide Gare to patients (suffering from tuberculosis).
46    Today, the work of these philanthropie associations has been complemented by the
activities  of  local  sections  of  international  organizations,  such  as  "Medecins  Sans
Frontières," and new volunteer groups preoccupied with the spread of drug use in Greece.
In Athens and a few other large urban centers there are approximately fifty voluntary
associations offering help to drug users with the assistance of physicians, parents of drug
users  and  former  drug  addicts52 Of  related  nature  are  nineteen  non-governmental
organizations which work on problems of public health and development in the Third
World53. Finally, there is a plethora of local cultural clubs, staging drama performances
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and music concerts and showing films particularly during the summer months in small
towns  all  over  Greece.  The  activities  of  local  voluntary  associations  still  remain
unexplored, although one may hypothesize that they are often linked to the financial
resources and the political profile of the local government from which cultural initiatives
usually emanate.
47    The tripartite relationship among the central bureaucracy, political parties, and social
movements  is  a  complex  one.  Obviously  the  state  corporatism  witnessed  in  the
development  of  labor  movements  and the  fragile  pluralism of  social  movements  are
interconnected phenomena. One may speculate that the prevalence of state corporatism
in industrial relations is partially responsible for the underdevelopment of new social
movements.  The  chances  of  new  social  movements  to  emerge  must  have  been
compromised  by  the  class-biased  state  corporatism in  the  sense  that  political  party
polarization and endurance of ideological cleavages may have permeated all organized
forms of civil society, including the major women's unions and the peace movement.
48    Still, contemporary Greek civil society is not as weak as it is widely believed. Although
large segments of civil society, including the official trade union movement and some
new social movements, have succumbed to the main political parties, there are segments
in other  sectors,  such as  the labor  organizations  of  the wider  public  sector  and the
majority of the new social movements, which have preserved their relative independence
from the short-term strategies of the political parties which bid for power. At the same
time, in the industriel and shipping sectors business associations have managed to avoid
the tutelage of any governing party, preserving their interests in an autonomous fashion
which labor unions have never been allowed to enjoy.
49    In that respect the Greek system of interest representation shares elements from the
state corporatist system and simultaneously the pluralist system. The mixed nature of the
mode  of  interest  representation  in  Greece  implies  that  the  state  has  a  class  or
"segmentary" nature, favoring certain societal interests over others, but overall keeping
the powerless segments of civil  society under centralized control.  The image is more
complicated than the dichotomy "state" versus "societal" corporatism would imply, since
the Greek state cannot prevent pluralism from existing in two sectors, namely in the
representation of business interests, which are powerful enough, and in the sector of
single-issue civil associations, which are not yet as threatening as labor unions. Still, if
there is  no change in the internal  party structure and the polarization of  the party
system, chances are that as soon as a new social movement acquires strength, it will be
absorbed by the major political parties.
50    The bureaucracy, on the other hand, is weaker than it is usually thought and it has itself
been moulded by parties alternating in power. Although over the last twenty years the
size of the bureaucracy has grown, its power vis-a-vis the political elites has not increased
in a corresponding way and it may have decreased. Given the extent of permeation of
bureaucratic structures and personnel by party factionalism after the rise of PASOK and
later by the come-back of New Democracy, it could be that the administrative system has
witnessed a decrease in its limited autonomy from the political system.
51    The relation between bureaucracy and civil society in Greece after the transition to
democracy is not only different from zero-sum, but also seems to be a spurious relation.
The weakness of  the Greek bureaucracy cannot be attributed to the strength of  civil
society or vice versa, but the relative underdevelopment and misgrowth of both should be
due to a third, hidden variable, which should by now be apparent to the reader. After
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1974  civil  society  has  shown  signs  of  awakening,  particularly  in  the  form  of  civil
associations and unions of public employees. Yet this society remains relatively weak,
being overrun by the practices of state corporatism which have survived the period of
post-war  "guided"  democracy  and  the  seven-year  long  military  dictatorship.  The
enduring weakness of the civil society cannot be attributed to the encroachment of the
Greek  bureaucracy  since  the  latter  is  itself  neither  strong  or  autonomous,  but  also
remains weak compared to the main political party organizations. The Greek case is an
example of  a "negative-sum" relation between state and society.  The value of  Alfred
Stepan's original schema lies exactly in taking into account the possibility that both state
and society may be weak, as it seems to have been the case of contemporary Greece.
52    In concluding, it seems plausible to argue that civil society and bureaucracy are still
rather weak in contemporary Greece because they are both under the tutelage of very
strong political parties, which constitute the third, hidden variable. The explanation of
the emergence of very strong political parties in the first place is a wholly different issue
from the issue explored in this paper. Although the influence of social class cleavages on
political conflict may not be negligible, the polarized structure of the party system itself
and the influence of legacies of acute party conflict in the interwar period and civil war in
the immediate postwar have possibly been the prime causal factors behind the extensive
penetration of civil society by political parties.
53    It may be that in the beginning of the 1990s the Third Greek Democracy, which was
founded in 1974, witnessed an emergence of a civil society stronger than the inchoate one
of the immediate post-authoritarian period. Recent studies indicate that employers and
employees have started negotiating with each other without the overbearing presence of
the central state authorities54. In 1990 GSEE and SEV signed a two-year long collective
agreement without being directly monitored by the Ministry of National Economy. The
same happened in 1992. In the meantime a consulting agency, INE, was founded under the
auspices of GSEE and SEV to promote research on labor markets, working conditions and
labor relations in Greece. Another public agency (OME) was founded in 1990 to mediate
between the associations of employers and employees. However, it is still too early to
suggest that there is a transition from state corporatism in labor relations in Greece.
54    It is also early to judge whether Greek civil society has been permeated by party-wide
nationalist commotions. A comprehensive study is needed to assess the emergence of the
nationalist movement in Greece of the 1990s and the relatively small party penetration of
it.  Indeed,  massive rallies,  organized not by political  parties but by local community,
school and church authorities were held in major Greek cities between 1992 and 1994. In
the meantime, one can pass the following judgment about the first twenty years of the
Third Greek Democracy (1974-1994): if there was an index of "partyness" to evaluate the
extent to which a certain society was permeated by party politics over a given time
period,  post-authoritarian  Greece  would  probably  rank  very  high  among  European
democracies as one of the most party-politicized societies in the European Union55.
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